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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
T. ROBERT CORDNER and GLORIA 
CORDNER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DARREL L. ROSS and CLELLA C. 
ROSS, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 960585-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellants' Brief 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in 
accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
and Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(j) (1994 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues on appeal all relate to the trial court's action 
in granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Appellants contend that the trial court committed error in 
granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and relies 
upon the following lines of reasoning to support their position. 
1. The Trial Court Committed Error in Ruling, as a Matter 
of Law that there were no Justiciable Issues of Fact 
and that the Defendants were Entitled to Judgment as a 
Matter of Law. 
The Appellants preserved the issue in the Memoranda and 
affidavits submitted in opposition to the Defendantsf Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 38-62; 63-64; 65-81; 261-280). 
On appeal, this Court, in determining the propriety of the 
trial court's action in granting a motion for summary judgment, 
views the facts and inferences therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Because 
summary judgments are decided as questions of law, the Appellate 
Court accords no deference to the trial court's determination 
and reviews the issues under a correctness standard. Taylor v. 
Oqden City School District, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah 1996); 
Viking Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 
1996); Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 
(Utah 1996). 
2. The Trial Court Committed Error in Ruling, as a Matter 
of Law, that the Applicable Statute of Limitations 
Began to Run in July of 1984 and Expired Before the 
Filing of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
The Appellants preserved the issue in the Memoranda and 
affidavits submitted in opposition to the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 38-62; 63-64; 65-81; 261-280). 
Summary judgment is only proper when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; Winegar v. Froerer, Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 
(Utah 1991). Because a challenge for summary judgment requires 
only a review of questions of law, the Appellate Court accords no 
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions but reviews 
them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., 814 P.2d 1108, 
2 
1111-12 (Utah 1991). 
The Defendants in this case bear the burden of proving every 
element necessary to establish that the statute of limitations 
barred the Plaintiffs' claim. Seale v. Gowens, 923 P.2d 1361 
(Utah 1996). 
3. Judge John R. Anderson Committed Error in Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Which had 
Previously been Denied by Judge Payne. 
The Appellants preserved the issue in the Memoranda and 
affidavits submitted in opposition to the Defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 38-62; 63-64; 65-81; 261-280). 
On appeal, this Court, in determining the propriety of the 
trial court's action in granting a motion for summary judgment, 
views the facts and inferences therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Because 
summary judgments are decided as questions of law, the Appellate 
Court accords no deference to the trial court's determination 
and reviews the issues under a correctness standard. Taylor v. 
Ogden City School District, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah 1996); 
Viking Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 
1996); Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 
(Utah 1996). 
The "law of the case" doctrine embodies the principle that a 
court should not reconsider or overrule a decision made by a co-
equal court. Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 
735-36 (Utah 1984). 
DISPOSITIVE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
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In relevant part, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides as follows: 
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material of fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law . . . . (Emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to enforce the 
terms of two Uniform Real Estate Contracts, dated June 10, 1981 
and December 27, 1982. The Plaintiffs contend, that in 
derogation of the Plaintiffs1 rights under the contracts, the 
Defendants, without attempting to terminate the contractual 
relationship with the Plaintiffs, sold the property, which was 
the subject of the contracts between the parties, to third 
parties. 
B. Procedural Chronology of the Case. 
1. The Complaint was filed on August 21, 1991 (R. 1-11), 
and the Defendants' Answer was filed with the Court on December 
9, 1991 (R. 16-24). 
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2. On May 15, 1992, the Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment with supporting Memoranda (R. 36-62). The 
Plaintiffs submitted their Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on June 15, 1992 (R. 65-
81). On September 25, 1992, Judge A. Lynn Payne rendered his 
decision, denying the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
85-88). 
3. The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was filed on October 
15, 1993 (R. 167-182) and the Defendants' Answer to the Amended 
Complaint was filed on November 8, 1993 (183-192). 
4. The Defendants filed their second Motion for Summary 
Judgment with supporting Memoranda and affidavit on May 15, 1996 
(R. 198-252). The Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment 
on June 4, 1996 (R. 261-280). The Defendants' Reply Memorandum 
was filed on June 14, 1996 (285-286). 
5. Judge John R. Anderson signed the Order granting the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on July 15, 1996 and the 
same was filed on July 17, 1996 (R. 304-305). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The Plaintiff T. Robert Cordner resides in Utah County 
and, as an occupation, operates three service stations (Robert 
Cordner deposition of 2/3/92 at 3-4 [hereinafter referred to as 
R.C. deposition]). 
2. The Plaintiff, Mr. Cordner, had known the Defendant 
Darrel L. Ross for approximately ten years. The Defendant, Mr. 
5 
Ross, had been a regular customer in the Orem service station 
operated by the Plaintiff, Robert Cordner (R.C. deposition of 
2/3/92 at 5). 
3. The Defendant, Darrel Ross informed the Plaintiff that 
he had a piece of vacant property for sale in the Roosevelt area 
and asked the Plaintiff Cordner if he was interested in looking 
at the parcel (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 6). 
4. The Plaintiff, after visiting the site on at least two 
occasions, entered into negotiations with the Defendant, Darrel 
L. Ross (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 7-8). 
5. The Plaintiff, T. Robert Cordner became interested in 
purchasing the subject property based upon the Defendant Darrel 
Ross' representation that he was going to build a restaurant and 
motel on adjoining property. Based upon that representation, the 
Plaintiff was interested in purchasing the offered piece to build 
a truck stop (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 8-10). 
6. On or about June 10, 1981, the parties executed an 
Uniform Real Estate Contract wherein the Defendants agreed to 
sell two acres of property to the Plaintiffs for the sum of 
$40,000.00. In addition, the Uniform Real Estate Contract gave 
the Plaintiffs an option or first right of refusal to purchase an 
additional acre from the Defendants (Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, Addendum, Exhibit "A"). 
7. Pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract of June 10, 1981, the Plaintiffs were to pay $2,000.00 
down with an additional $8,000.00 to be paid by September 1, 
6 
1981. The Contract then required annual payments of $6,000.00 
plus interest on June 10 of each year commencing June of 1982 for 
a period of five years (Uniform Real Estate Contract, Addendum, 
Exhibit "A"). 
8. On or about December 27, 1982, the parties executed an 
Uniform Real Estate Contract wherein the Plaintiffs agreed to 
sell to the Defendants an additional acre of land for the sum of 
$20,000.00. The Plaintiffs were to pay $5,000.00 down with an 
additional $3,000.00 to be paid by January 31, 1984 with 
interest. Annual payments of $3,000.00 were to be made on 
January 31 of each year for a period of five years with accrued 
interest (Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 12/27/82, Addendum, 
Exhibit "B"). 
9. The Plaintiffs paid the following amounts on the 
Contracts with the Defendants: 
DATE AMOUNT 
6/81 $2,000.00 
9/81 $8,000.00 
7/12/82 $2,500.00 
8/3/82 $2,500.00 
1/25/83 $5,000.00 
6/17/83 $2,880.00 
7/25/83 $3,000.00 
8/4/83 $3,000.00 
1/6/84 $ 191.77 
2/16/84 $1,500.00 
3/2/84 $1,500.00 
3/28/84 $1,000.00 
4/6/84 $ 800.00 
11/30/84 $ 211.69 
Exhibit "3" to R.C. deposition of 2/3/92; R.C. deposition of 
2/3/92 at 18-22; Uniform Real Estate Contract, Addendum, Exhibit 
"B." 
7 
10. Although the Plaintiffs did not make all the payments 
to the Defendants when due under the terms of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts, the parties developed a mutually acceptable 
process of resolving the issue. In explaining how payments were 
made after June of 1983, the Plaintiff T. Robert Cordner 
testified as follows: 
Q Do you have any specific recollection of 
having made payments to him on that contract after June 
of 1983? 
A When Darrel came out to get the money I just 
put "Roosevelt property" on my checks and I would give 
him, whether the payment was in full or not I would 
just check my bank account and I had certain payments 
coming in and I would give him a different amount. 
Q Was this because you were delinquent and you 
were not able to make the full amount of the payment in 
one lump sum? 
A No. I would say I have this much in the 
account, can I give you this check today? And it was 
acceptable to him. 
R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 20. 
11. During the period from May to July of 1984, the 
Plaintiff Robert Cordner visited the property he was purchasing 
from the Defendants and observed that a power line had been 
constructed on the property that he was purchasing (R.C. 
deposition of 2/3/92 at 23-25; R.C. deposition of 12/1/93 at 20-
8 
21 )• 
12. Without any notice to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants, 
on or about April 6, 1984, executed a Right-of-Way Easement 
Agrement in favor of Moon Lake Electric Association. Under the 
terms of the Easement, Moon Lake was allowed to construct power 
lines and poles across the property sold to the Plaintiffs under 
the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts executed by the 
parties. Additionally, the Defendants represented that they 
were: 
. • . the owner[s] of the above-described lands 
and that the said lands are free and clear of 
encumbrances and liens of whatsoever character except 
those held by the following persons: [none listed]. 
Right-of-Way Easement, Addendum, Exhibit "C". 
12. The Defendants received the sum of $13,559.00 from the 
Moon Lake Electric Association for the execution of the Right-
of-Way Easement, none of which was paid to the Plaintiffs or 
credited to the payment of the amounts due under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts (Darrel Ross deposition of 4/9/92 at 16-22; 
Right-of-Way Easement, Addendum, Exhibit "C"). 
13. The Defendant Darrel Ross testified that he executed 
the Right-of-Way Easement in favor of Moon Lake Electric 
Association because the Plaintiffs had quit paying on the Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts and apparently were not interested in going 
forward with the purchase of the property with the Defendants 
(D.R. deposition of 4/9/92 at 17). However, on the same date the 
9 
Right-of-Way Easement was signed by the Defendants, April 6, 
1984, the Plaintiff Robert Cordner gave the Defendant a check in 
the sum of $800•00 as payment on the Contracts (D.R. deposition 
of 4/9/92 at 26-28; Defendants' answer to Plaintiffs1 
interrogatory number 3; Exhibit "3" to R.C. deposition of 
2/3/92). 
14. Contradicting himself, the Defendant Darrel Ross 
testified that he signed the Right-of-Way Easement because he had 
already talked with the Plaintiff Robert Cordner about changing 
the boundaries of the property described in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts to land not encumbered with the Right-of-Way 
Easement with Moon Lake (D.R. deposition at 17). 
15. The Plaintiff, Robert Cordner testified that within a 
few days after discovering the presence of the power lines on the 
property he thought he was purchasing, which occurred in period 
from May to July, 1984, he discussed the matter with the 
Defendant and told him: 
. . . the property was no good to me [Cordner] with 
an easement down through there, that's why I 
purchased the other acre of property, and that I 
didn't want the property, he could sell it to 
somebody else and give me my money back . . . . 
R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 25. 
In response, Ross inquired of the Plaintiff whether he would 
be satisfied with the return of the principal payments to which 
the Plaintiff responded " • . . hell no, you violated the 
10 
contract, I want my money back." (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 
26). Ross then suggested that the boundaries of the property 
sold to Cordner be changed to eliminate the easement problem: 
Then I [Cordner] expressed my concern about there's 
a little road between us and the motel and et. 
cetera where he was going to build. And he said 
that was no problem. I said, is there still enough 
room for the motel and restaurant? And he said 
yes. 
R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 26. 
16. The Defendant Darrel Ross acknowledges that he met with 
the Plaintiff after the Right-of-Way Easement was signed, because 
of the Plaintiffs concerns over the power line. The Defendant 
reports the conversation as follows: 
Well, he was not completely happy about it. I had 
no control over it because they were going to put 
it there. And they said they had to have a pole 
to stretch it across the highway there. And 
that's when—again, we discussed about moving the 
property after the poles went in, if there was a 
problem, why, we would move the property because 
we could go back or we could go across the road 
and put it on the other corner, or wherever we had a 
lot. We had a lot of frontage there on the 
property there on the highway. 
D.R. deposition of 4/9/92 at 16). 
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17. The Plaintiff, Robert Cordner, testified that he had one 
additional conversation with the Defendant concerning the 
transaction that occurred in the Fall of 1984, During that 
conversation, the Defendant Darrel Ross indicated that he was 
going to change the boundary lines to resolve the problem (R.C. 
deposition of 2/3/92 at 27). 
18. Further contradicting the Defendant's contention that 
the Plaintiffs had given up their rights under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts is the fact that the Defendant Darrel Ross 
testified that he advised Moon Lake Electric Association, when 
the Right-of-Way Easement was negotiated, that the Plaintiffs 
were purchasing the property over which the Easement was given 
(D.R. deposition at 31). 
19. On or about December 27, 1985, the Defendants conveyed 
the subject property, described in the two Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts executed with the Plaintiffs, by special warranty deed, 
to George W. Mills and his wife (Special Warranty Deed, Addendum, 
Exhibit "D") George Mills was the business partner of the 
Defendant (D.R. deposition at 21-23). 
20. At no time have the Defendants given the Plaintiffs any 
written notice claiming the Plaintiffs were in default under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contracts executed by the parties or seeking 
any relief based upon the Plaintiffs' failure to pay (D.R. 
deposition at 43). 
21. After the Plaintiffs made the payments to the 
Defendants as summarized above, the Defendant Ross charged the 
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sum of $20.50 at the Plaintiffs' business on November 24, 1986, 
although Ross acknowledged that he did not have a charge account 
at the Plaintiffs' business (D.R. deposition at 33-34). 
22. From November 30, 1984 to February 3, 1992, the 
Plaintiff Robert Cordner visited the subject property on at 
least four occasions and observed nothing which would indicate 
that the property had been sold to third parties (R.C. deposition 
of 2/3/92 at 32-33). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellants contend that the trial court committed error 
in granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Appellants contend that there are genuine issues of material fact 
that precluded the granting of summary judgment and secondly, 
that the Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law as required by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Appellants claim that the trial court committed error in 
adjudicating the facts and law regarding the statute of 
limitations applicable to the causes of action contained in the 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. The Appellants contend that the 
trial court improperly considered and determined factual issues 
relating to the statute of limitations and applied incorrect 
legal principles in determining when the causes of action 
contained in the Amended Complaint accrued. 
Lastly, the Appellants contend that the trial court 
committed error in over-ruling the previous ruling of a district 
court judge who denied the Defendants' first Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CONTRACT ISSUES 
CONTAINED IN THE PLAINTIFFS1 AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
A, The Factual and Legal Background Relating to the 
Plaintiffs1 Contract Claims and the Granting of Summary 
Judgment. 
1. Summary of the Contract Issues Contained in the 
Amended Complaint. 
In the Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs in this 
case, the Plaintiffs seek an order of rescission based upon the 
failure of the Defendants to provide clear and marketable title 
to the property described in the two Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts (R. 167-182). 
The Second Cause of Action in the Amended Complaint is one 
based on breach of contract. The Plaintiffs contend therein that 
the Defendant breached the terms of the two Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts by failing to provide clear and marketable title to 
the property described in the Contracts (R. 167-182). 
2. The Applicable Statute of Limitations. 
The parties acknowledge and agree that the relevant statute 
of limitations governing actions based on a written contract is a 
six year statute of limitations as contained in Utah Code 
Annotated 78-12-23(2) (1994 as Amended) (R. 198-246). 
3. Summary of the Trial Court's Ruling. 
In Judge Anderson's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Summary Judgment filed on July 10, 1996 
(Addendum, Exhibit ffE"), the court ruled as follows: 
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. . . The underlying facts relevant to Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment are undisputed. To the 
extent there is any disputed, relevant fact, the Court 
views the evidence in light most favorable to the 
Plaintiffs. The relevant facts are that the Plaintiffs 
and Defendants entered into two uniform real estate 
contracts in June 1981 and December 1982; in breach of 
those contracts, Defendants gave an easement across the 
property in March or April 1984; Plaintiff Robert 
Cordner was personally aware of the easement and breach 
in July 1984, when he told Defendant Darrel Ross that 
Ross had breached his contract with Plaintiffs. At 
that time, Mr. Cordner demanded his payments back. At 
that time, Defendant Darrel Ross offered to adjust the 
boundaries to the property being sold but no agreement 
was reached between the parties to do so or to return 
any payments made. After Mr. Cordner treated the 
contracts as breached by Defendants, Plaintiff did not 
take any legal action to enforce his rights or seek 
legal redress until August 1991. As a result, 
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, Causes I and 
II of the Amended Complaint, are barred by the six-year 
statute of limitation for actions on a written 
contract, Utah Code Annotated 78-12-23. 
R. 304-305. 
4. Summary of the Law Relating to the Granting of 
Summary Judgment. 
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Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that the trial court should grant summary judgment only when the 
"pleadings, depositions . . . together with affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material of fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." 
In interpreting Rule 56(c), the Utah Appellate Courts have 
held that the trial court should view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. Salt Lake Investment v. Wilford 
Hansen Quarries, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 1996); Glover v. Boy 
Scouts of America, supra. Because summary judgment is a question 
of law, no deference is given to the trial court's resolution of 
the legal issues presented. Berenda v. Langford, 843 P.2d 45 
(1996). Most importantly, summary judgment, by definition, does 
not resolve factual issues. Healey v. J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., 
892 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, a trial court cannot, in 
reviewing a motion for summary judgment weigh disputed evidence. 
The sole inquiry is whether material issues of fact exist. 
Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995); House v. 
Armour of America, 886 P.2d 542 (Utah 1994). 
B. The Trial Court Committed Error, in Ruling as a Matter 
of Law, that the Applicable Statute of Limitations 
Commenced to Run Upon the Plaintiffs' Discovery of 
Power Poles on the Property Described in the Contracts. 
1. Summary of the Facts Relating to the Defendants' 
Breach. 
As outlined in the Statement of Facts, the Plaintiff Robert 
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Cordner visited the property in question during the period from 
May to July 1994. At that time he observed power poles on the 
property he thought was included in the Contracts executed with 
the Defendants (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 23-25; R.C. 
deposition of 12/1/93 at 20-21). 
After the Plaintiff observed the poles, he confronted the 
Defendant Darrel Ross who offered to change the boundaries of the 
property to eliminate the easement problem (R.C. deposition of 
2/3/92 at 26). j 
Aside from the granting of the right-of-way easement to the 
Moon Lake Electric Association, the Defendants committed one 
other act in contravention to the requirements of the two Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts. On December 27, 1985, the Defendants 
conveyed the property described in the two Real Estate Contracts 
with the Plaintiffs, by special warranty deed, to George W. 
Mills, a business partner of the Defendant Darrel Ross (D.R. 
deposition of 4/9/92 at 21-23; Addendum, Exhibit "D"). 
Accordingly, there were two independent actions of the 
Defendants that could be interpreted as breaches of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts executed by the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants. The first, the granting of an easement by the 
Defendants on April 6, 1984 which the Plaintiff discovered during 
the period from May to July of 1984. The second, the actual 
conveyance of the property to a third party, the Mills, on 
December 27, 1985, which the Plaintiff had no knowledge of until 
shortly before the Complaint in this action was filed. 
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2. The Granting of the Right-of-Way Easement by the 
Defendants did not Start the Running of the 
Statute of Limitations. 
Generally, 
. . . A cause of action accrues and the relevant 
statute of limitations begins to run "upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action" . . . . 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84-86 (Utah 1981); Warren v. Provo 
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1992); Walker Drug Co, 
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1995). 
The trial court erroneously held that the granting of the 
right-of-way easement and the Plaintiff's discovery thereof 
commenced the running of the statute of limitations. The court 
completely ignored the established case law in Utah regarding the 
time when a vendor under uniform real estate contract is 
required to provide clear title. The basic principle is that a 
"vendor in a real estate contract in generally not obliged to 
have full and clear marketable title at all time during the 
pendency of his contract to sell because, ordinarily, title need 
not be conveyed until the final payment is made or tendered." 
Leavitt v. Blohm, 357 P.2d 190-192-93 (Utah 1960); Woodward v. 
Allen, 265 P.2d 398 (Utah 1953). 
Paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts executed 
by the parties explicitly provides: 
The Seller on receiving the payments herein 
reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner 
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above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to the 
Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed 
conveying the title to the above described premises 
free and clear of all encumbrances . . . . 
Addendum, Exhibits "A" and "B." 
Additionally, a vendor is allowed a reasonable time to 
effect title and to clear any encumbrances. Walker v. Bintz, 
280 P.2d 767 (Utah 1955); Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195, 1198 
(Utah 1981); Callister v. Millstream Associates, Inc., 738 P.2d 
662 (Utah App. 1987). In fact, paragraph 18 of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts executed by the parties gives the Buyer, the 
Plaintiff herein, the option of resolving the encumbrances 
himself (Addendum, Exhibits "A" and "B"). 
Obviously, there are circumstances when a seller has lost or 
encumbered his ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill 
his contract. Under those circumstances, a breach has occurred 
and arguably, the statute of limitations commences to run on that 
particular breach. Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 485 P.2d 
1402 (1971); Treamont Investment Co. v. Home, 202 P. 547 (Utah 
1921). The basic test of whether an encumbrance incurred before 
a vendor is required to provide title under an executory 
contract, is actionable was identified in Neves v. Wright, supra 
at 1199: 
The basic test in determining whether a buyer can 
rescind is whether the defect, by its nature, is one 
that can be removed, as a practical matter, is 
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distinguished by defects, which, by their nature, 
cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter. 
[Citing case]. A defect which, by its nature cannot be 
removed by the seller as a practical matter is one "of 
such a nature that the vendor neither has title nor in 
a practical sense any prospect of acquiring it." 
Although easements generally constitute encumbrances that 
cloud title, there is an exception that is applicable to the 
facts of this case. In Hunt v. Bremer, 276 P. 964 (Idaho 1929), 
the Court held that a public road right-of-way is not an 
encumbrance of violation of a contract warranty of title 
provision, as a matter of law. The Court stated: 
It is Apparent that if an encumbrance is a right 
or interest which diminishes the value of the land, no 
easement or other right should be regarded as an 
encumbrance which essential to its enjoyment and by 
which its value is enhanced. The modern trend, now 
firmly established, is that the existence of certain 
public easements, or easements beneficially effecting 
the land such as a public road right-of-way or canal 
do not constitute encumbrances within the meaning of 
covenants against encumbrances. (Emphases added). 
The test is whether the encumbrances or easement is (1) 
essential to the enjoyment of the real property, and (2) enhance 
the value of the real property. Campagna v. Parker, 779 P.2d 409 
(Idaho 1989). 
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In order for the trial court to determine that the granting 
of the right-of-way easement commenced the running of the statute 
of limitations, the court had to resolve a large number of 
factual issues. The trial court totally disregarded the legal 
maxim that the Defendants were not obligated to provide 
marketable title until the payments were made and that an 
anticipatory breach or repudiation of a contract does not create 
a cause of action. Upland Industries Corp. v. Pacific Gamble 
Robinson, Co., 634 P.2d 638 (Utah 1994). 
The court then, without any evidence, apparently determined 
the description of the property over which the right-of-way 
easement ran and somehow platted that description over the 
property described in the two Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
There was no evidence submitted to the court that the property 
described in the easement with Moon Lake ran over the property 
described in both Contracts executed by the parties or was simply 
limited to one. Although the Plaintiff thought the power pole 
was located on property he purchased, there was no testimony 
regarding the legal description and importantly, which Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, the easement would have violated. 
The court then apparently resolved the clearly factual issue 
of whether the right-of-way easement was of "such a nature" that 
the Defendants neither had the required title nor any prospect of 
requiring it. Neves v. Wright, supra. No testimony was 
introduced in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment that the 
Defendants could not obtain a relocation of the easement to other 
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property, if the Plaintiffs were unwilling to accept the 
easement. The Defendants received over $13,000.00 for the right-
of-way and certainly could have paid to relocate a power pole so 
that it did not traverse the property described in the Contract. 
Further, the Defendants owned the adjoining piece of 
property upon which he was going to build a restaurant and motel 
next to the piece of property the Plaintiffs were purchasing to 
construct a gas station R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 8-10). 
There is no reason to believe that the Defendants could not have 
relocated the easement grant to Moon Lake to their property which 
adjoined the property sold to the Plaintiffs. Certainly the 
Defendants had the "reasonable prospect" of providing clear title 
when the required payments were made. 
There simply was no evidence from which the trial court could 
have reasonably concluded that the Defendants had no prospect of 
acquiring title to the property encumbered by the easement. 
In addition to the fact issues surrounding the prospect of 
moving the easement and renegotiating the relocation of the 
power pole with Moon Lake Electric Association, the trial court 
made absolutely no determination as to whether an easement for 
the placement of power poles and electrical service constituted 
an encumbrance in violation of the implied covenants of a 
warranty deed. The granting of an easement to provide electrical 
power is certainly the type of easement that would meet the 
requirements of the "rule of reason" that the encumbrance is 
"essential to the enjoyment of the real property" and "enhance 
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the value of the real property." Campagna v. Parker, supra at 
413. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's 
decision regarding the easement as commencing the running of the 
statute of limitations was faulty in that it ignored the clearly 
established proposition that a vendor does not have an obligation 
to provide clear title until payment has been made. Secondly, 
the trial court resolved clearly factual issues regarding whether 
the power easement constituted a violation of the implied 
warranties and whether the Defendant had a realistic prospect of 
removing the encumbrance if the court found the easement to 
constitute a breach of the Contract. 
3. In the Alternative, Even if the Statute of 
Limitations Expired as it Relates to the Granting 
of the Easement, the Plaintiffs Timely Filed the 
Action Based upon the Defendants1 Outright 
Conveyance of the Real Property. 
The most critical mistake made by the trial court in 
granting summary judgment on the Contract claims contained in the 
Plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint is the assumption that all of the 
Plaintiffs' rights terminated upon the expiration of six years 
from the Defendants' first breach of the Contracts. 
A simple illustration may be helpful. As with most typical 
real estate contracts, the purchaser has a number of obligations 
from making payments, paying taxes, carrying insurance, 
maintaining the property and other explicit and implied duties. 
No one would argue that if a seller failed to sue a purchaser 
within six years after the purchaser had allowed the insurance to 
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lapse for a period of time, that all of the rights of the seller 
were thereby extinguished under the contract. Yet, in this case 
the trial court took the position that because more than six 
years elapsed from the granting of the easement by the 
Defendants, all of the rights of the Plaintiffs in the Contracts 
were extinguished. 
Each breach of the Contracts by the Defendants created a 
separate cause of action for the Plaintiffs. Ashe v. State, 572 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977); Tolman v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, 560 
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977); Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 (Utah 
1975); O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 479 (Utah 1970). Even if the 
court finds that the right to sue the Defendants over the 
granting of the easement elapsed before the Complaint was filed, 
that failure does not effect any other rights which subsequently 
accrue from the Contracts. 
In must be remembered that neither the Plaintiffs nor the 
Defendants took any steps to terminate the two Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts after the existence of the right-of-way easement 
was discovered by the Plaintiffs. There were no writings of any 
kind exchanged between the parties and even in their 
conversations, no one voiced an intent to terminate the 
Contracts. 
At most, the trial court should only have held that the 
failure of the Plaintiffs to commence a suit in a timely fashion 
based upon the execution of the easement by the Defendants 
constituted a waiver of that defect. John Price Associates, Inc. 
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v. Davis, 588 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1978). Even if the court did find 
the elements of waiver consisting of a voluntary relinquishment 
of a right, the court could only find that the Plaintiffs' rights 
to that specific cause of action were extinguished. 
There is no case law to support the proposition that if a 
bank or other vendor accepts a late payment, non-payment or a 
specific breach on one occasion, without filing suit, all rights 
under that contract are extinguished after the statute of 
limitations relating to the first breach has expired. 
The trial court should have held that the applicable statute 
of limitations related to the granting of the easement did not 
expire before the Complaint was filed. In the alternative, the 
trial court committed error in holding that the failure to 
commence a timely action based upon the execution of the easement 
somehow extinguished all of the Plaintiffs' rights under the two 
Uniform Real Estate Contracts. Accordingly, any finding related 
to the timeliness of the Plaintiffs' action based upon the 
execution of the easement is not dispositive of the cause of 
action based upon the conveyance of the property, the Mills. 
C. The Trial Court Committed Error, in Ruling as a Matter 
of Law, that the Statute of Limitations Applicable to 
the Defendants1 Breach by Conveying the Property to a 
Third Party Expired Before the Filing of the 
Complaint. 
As outlined above, any ruling of the trial court with regard 
to the statute of limitations applicable to the Defendants' 
breach in executing the easement does not control the disposition 
of the issues relating to the conveyance of the property by the 
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Defendants to their business partner, Mills. The act of 
executing the easement and the conveyance of the property 
constitute two separate occurrences, each creating a separate 
cause of action. 
A cause of action accrues "upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action." Walker Drug 
Co. v. La Sal Oil, supra at 1231. 
The undisputed facts in this case reveal that the Defendants 
did not convey the subject property to their business partner 
George W. Mills until December 27, 1985. The Complaint in this 
case was filed on August 21, 1991, before the expiration of the 
six year period contained in the applicable statute of 
limitations, Utah Code Annotated 78-12-23(2) (1994 as Amended). 
Further, the Plaintiff Robert Cordner testified that he did not 
know that the Defendants had conveyed the property and in fact 
from November 30, 1984 to February 3, 1992, visited the subject 
property on at least four different occasions and observed 
nothing which would indicate the subject property had been sold 
or transferred (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 32-33). 
It is interesting to note that Judge Payne in his decision 
initially denying the Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment 
found that the Plaintiffs did not discover the sale to Mr. Mills 
by the Defendants until 1990 (R. 85-88). Using either the actual 
date the conveyance to Mills was made or the date it was 
discovered by the Plaintiffs, the action was timely filed under 
the statute of limitations of six years applicable to written 
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contracts. 
Utah case law establishes that the discovery rule may 
operate to toll the period of limitations "until the discovery of 
facts forming the basis for the cause of action." Warren v. 
Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992); Myers v. McDonald, 
supra at 84. The Utah Appellate Courts have recognized that the 
discovery rule applies, 
. . . In situations where a plaintiff does not 
become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and 
. . . In situations where the case presents exceptional 
circumstances and the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery 
of the cause of action. 
Warren, supra at 1149. 
In this case, there is no question that there is a factual 
issue relating to the Defendants' conduct. The Defendants 
conveyed the property which was the subject of the Contracts with 
the Plaintiffs to their business partner. The Defendants never 
took any steps to terminate the Contracts with the Plaintiffs or 
to advise the Plaintiffs that they intended to convey the 
property. Instead, the Defendants kept all of the money paid by 
the Plaintiffs and, without more, conveyed the property to their 
partner. The evidence certainly supports Judge Payne's finding 
that the Plaintiff did not discover the sale to Mills until 1990 
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and pursuant to the discovery rule, the statute had only run for 
approximately one year before the Complaint was filed. 
Obviously, if the application of the discovery rule is 
needed in this case based upon the contract theories alleged in 
the Amended Complaint, there are a myriad of factual issues 
related to the Defendants concealment that would have to be 
resolved by the finder of fact. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Causes of Action, 
Count I and II of the Amended Complaint based upon the conveyance 
of the property to Mr. Mills were timely filed before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANTSy MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FRAUD ISSUES 
CONTAINED IN THE PLAINTIFFS1 AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
A. The Factual and Legal Background Relating to the 
Plaintiffs1 Fraud Claims and the Granting of Summary 
Judgment. 
1. Summary of the Fraud Issues Contained in the 
Amended Complaint. 
The Third Cause of Action of the Plaintiffs1 Amended 
Complaint seeks a determination that the Defendants, both of whom 
executed the right-of-way easement agreement with Moon Lake 
Electric Association and the deed conveying the property to Mills 
engaged in fraudulent conduct justifying the award of general, 
special and punitive damages. 
2. The Applicable Statute of Limitations. 
The parties acknowledge and agree that the relevant statute 
of limitations governing actions based on fraud is Utah Code 
Annotated 78-12-26(3) (1994 as Amended) which provides: 
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Within three years: 
(3) An action for relief upon the grounds of fraud 
or mistake; except that the cause of action in such 
case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud 
or mistake. (Emphasis added). 
Id; R. 198-246. 
3. Summary of the Trial Court's Ruling. 
In Judge Anderson's Order Granting Summary Judgment, the 
court ruled as follows: 
Plaintiffs also claim that they were defrauded or 
lulled into inaction by the offer of Defendant Darrel 
Ross in July 1984 to change the boundaries and to get 
back to Plaintiffs regarding that offer. The parties 
were then on an equal footing and neither had any 
advantage over the other. There was neither any 
agreement between the parties to return any payments 
nor promise by Defendant Ross to change the 
boundaries. There is no evidence that the Defendants 
concealed any claim or fact from the Plaintiff or made 
any false representation that rises to the level of 
fraud. To the extent Plaintiffs claim the statute of 
limitations is tolled because they were lulled into 
inaction on their claims by the promise of, "I'll get 
back to you," the Court determines that any reliance 
thereon for over seven years was unreasonable and does 
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not excuse Plaintiffs' failure to act within the period 
of the status of limitations. Plaintiffs' failure to 
institute a legal action for over seven years was not 
reasonable or excusable neglect, based upon the 
undisputed facts in this case. 
4. Summary of the Law Relating to the Granting of 
Summary Judgment. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that the trial court should grant summary judgment only when the 
"pleadings, depositions . . . together with affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material of fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." 
In interpreting Rule 56(c), the Utah Appellate Courts have 
held that the trial court should view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. Salt Lake Investment v. Wilford 
Hansen Quarries, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 1996); Glover v. Boy 
Scouts of America, supra. Because summary judgment is a question 
of law, to deference is given to the trial court's resolution of 
the legal issues presented. Berenda v. Langford, 843 P.2d 45 
(1996). Most importantly, summary judgment, by definition, does 
not resolve factual issues. Healey v. J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., 
892 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, a trial court cannot, in 
reviewing a motion for summary judgment weigh disputed evidence. 
The sole inquiry is whether material issues of fact exist. 
Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995); House v. 
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Armour of America, 886 P.2d 542 (Utah 1994). 
B. The Trial Court Committed Error, in Ruling as a Matter 
of Law, that the Statute of Limitations Applicable to 
Fraud Actions Expired Before the Filing of the 
Plaintiffsf Complaint. 
1. Summary of the Facts Relating to the Defendants' 
Fraud. 
The facts in this case reveal that the Defendants did not 
inform the Plaintiffs of the circumstances relating to the 
execution of the easement with Moon Lake. When the Plaintiff 
Robert Cordner confronted the Defendant, the Defendant told the 
Plaintiff that he would take the steps necessary to change the 
boundaries of the property to eliminate the problem. In a 
subsequent conversation in the Fall of 1984, the Defendant Darrel 
Ross again told the Plaintiff that he was going to change the 
boundary lines to resolve the easement problem (R.C. deposition 
2/3/92 at 27). 
The Defendants never took any steps to terminate the 
Plaintiffs' interest in the Contracts. The Defendants did not 
refund to the Plaintiffs any of the purchase price, did not 
initiate default procedures under the Contract or take any other 
action. The Defendants were careful not to provide the 
Plaintiffs with notice that on December 27, 1985, the Defendants 
together conveyed the subject property to their business partner, 
George W. Mills. Until 1992, the Plaintiff visited the property 
and could observe nothing that would indicate that the property 
had been sold. 
2. The Cause of Action Based on Fraud was Brought 
Within the Applicable Statute of Limitations. 
31 
As noted in Myers, supra at 84-86, a cause of action 
accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to run 
"upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action." 
The landmark case in Utah relating to the elements of 
fraudulent misrepresentation is Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 
144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952). As outlined in Pace, supra 
the essential elements in a fraudulent misrepresentation action 
are: 
1. [t]hat a representation was made; 
2. concerning a presently existing material of fact; 
3. which was false; 
4. which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false; or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; 
5. for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
6. that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; 
7. did in fact rely upon it; 
8. and was thereby induced to act; 
9. to his injury and damage. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "as to a cause of 
action based on fraud, the statute of limitations does not begin 
32 
to run until the fraud is discovered." Leach v. Anderson, 535 
P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1975). 
A superficial review of the Statement of Facts reveals that 
the Defendants made a representation concerning a presently 
existing fact. The Defendant told the Plaintiff that he was 
going to change the boundary line and subsequently that he was 
working on it. The Defendant told the Plaintiff in 1984 that he 
was going to change the boundary line. The statement that the 
Defendant had in fact proceeded with activity to change the 
boundaries of the property constituted a mis-statement 
of presently existing fact. Utah law establishes that if a 
person makes a promise and did not intend to perform the future 
promise when they made them, the misrepresentations are 
actionable. Berkeley Bank Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 
(Utah 1980). As noted by the Court: 
A closely similar problem is raised by a promise 
or statement of future conduct by one who, at the 
time, intends not to fulfill the promise. The 
promise itself is regarded as a representation of 
a present intention to perform. Hence, such a 
promise, made by one not intending to perform 
operates as a misrepresentation-a misrepresentation 
of the speaker's state of mind, at the time, and 
is actionable as a misrepresentation of "fact." 
To profess an intent to do or not to do, when 
a party intends the contrary, is as clear as 
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a misrepresentation and fraud as could be made. 
Accordingly, the Defendant's statements constituted a 
misrepresentation of a presently existing fact which the 
Defendant knew or should have known was false. 
There is no question that the Defendant knew or should have 
known that the statement relating to changes in the boundary line 
was false. Certainly it is clear that the Defendants' purpose in 
making the statement was to induce the Plaintiffs into a course 
of inaction. 
Having determined that the initial misrepresentation 
regarding the boundary line occurred in 1984, that the conveyance 
of the property to the third party occurred in December of 1985 
and that the Plaintiff visited the property regularly but did not 
learn of the conveyance to Mills until 1990, the question then 
becomes when the Plaintiff should have reasonably discovered all 
of the elements relevant to a cause of action based upon fraud. 
Utah recognizes the discovery rule which operates to toll 
the period of limitations until the discovery of the facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action. Walker Drug Co. v. La 
Sal, supra. 
As previously discussed, the discovery rule applies when, 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is 
mandated by statute; (2) in situations where a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the defendant's 
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) exceptional 
circumstances and the application of the general rule 
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would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery 
of the cause of action. 
Id. at 1129. 
In this case, the discovery rule should be employed because 
the statute mandates it, because of the Defendants' concealment 
and because of the circumstances of this case where the 
Defendants obtained a significant amount of money from the 
Plaintiffs and then surreptitiously encumbered the property and 
then sold it to third parties. 
Accordingly, the three year statute of limitations for 
fraud "begins to run from the time the person entitled to the 
property knows, or by reasonable diligence or inquiry should 
know, the relevant facts of fraud." Berenda v. Langford, supra 
at 6. In cases where the defendant took steps to conceal the 
plaintiff's cause of action, "the plaintiff can avoid the full 
operation of the discovery rule by making a prima facie showing 
of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the 
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the claim earlier. Id. See Warren v. Provo City 
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992) (balancing reasonableness 
of plaintiff's diligence in discovering claim against defendant's 
acts of concealment); Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (same); Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 538 
P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978) (finding that reasonable reliance on 
defendant's misrepresentations tolled statute of limitations 
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until discovery of cause of action). 
Chief Justice Zimmermann in Berenda explicitly held that: 
The application of this legal rule (discovery 
rule) to any particular set of facts is necessarily a 
matter left to the trial courts and finders of fact 
• In so holding, we explicitly acknowledge that 
weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct 
in light of the defendant's steps to conceal a cause of 
action necessitates the type of actual findings which 
precludes summary judgment in all but the clearest of 
cases. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only when 
the facts fall on two opposite ends of a factual 
continuum: either (i) when the facts are so clear that 
reasonable persons could not disagree about the 
underlying facts about the application of the governing 
legal standard to the facts or (ii) when the facts 
underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment or 
so tenuous, vague or insufficiently established that 
they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to concealment, with the result that the claim fails as 
a matter of law. (Emphasis added). 
There have been a number of other Utah cases relating to 
summary judgment motions involving allegations of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. In Condor v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 
Inc. , 739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. App. 1977), the Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court's granting of partial summary 
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judgment in a case involving a claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. The Court noted that "reasonable reliance 
must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and 
is usually a question for the jury to determine." Id. at 638. 
See also, Berkeley Bank Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 
1980). Further, Utah law establishes that generally a plaintiff 
may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without 
independent investigation. See Neuman v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 
1247 (Utah 1980). 
Utah law recognizes negligent misrepresentation. Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967). Negligent 
misrepresentation exists when one having a pecuniary interest in 
a transaction is in a superior position to know material facts 
and carelessly or negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them expecting the other party to act and rely thereon 
and the other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in the 
transaction. Certainly the Defendants' conduct constitutes 
negligent misrepresentation. 
The Court in Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 171 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), overturned the trial court's 
granting of summary judgment relating to fraudulent 
misrepresentation finding that the allegations claimed in the 
complaint supported a claim of fraud. 
The Plaintiffs have clearly established a prime facie case 
of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The Plaintiffs did not 
discover the misrepresentation until he learned of the transfer 
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of the property in 1990. The filing of the lawsuit in August of 
1991 was clearly within the statute of limitations. 
Judge Anderson's decision in this case that the Plaintiffs' 
reliance on the Defendants' statements for a period of seven 
years was unreasonable as a matter of law is not justified. The 
Defendant in addition to conveying the property to his partner 
Mills in 1985, failed to take any affirmative action to terminate 
the contracts with the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs continued to 
visit the property. Based upon the absence of any improvement on 
the land or physical signs showing the property had been 
conveyed, the Plaintiffs had no reason to believe that their 
rights under the Contract had been extinguished, there certainly 
is a factual issue relating to the reasonableness of the 
Plaintiffs' reliance. The Plaintiff reasonably believed that the 
Defendant was working on the change in the boundaries. Further, 
the Plaintiff was purchasing the property to build a truck stop 
next to the restaurant and motel that Mr. Ross was going to 
construct on his adjoining property. Because Mr. Ross had not 
started the construction of the motel and restaurant, the 
Plaintiffs were not in a hurry to finish the purchase of the 
property. Under the circumstances, the reliance was certainly 
reasonable. 
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Anderson's Order 
granting summary judgment on the fraud claims constitutes error 
and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a factual determination 
relating to the elements of fraud plead in the Amended Complaint. 
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Under the circumstances, it was not unusual for the Plaintiff to 
wait a period of years to finalize the payment. Clearly the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants were waiting for the economics in 
the Eastern Utah area to change to start the construction of the 
planned improvements. As long as the Defendants were taking no 
action to insist on stricter payments or to terminate the 
contracts, the Plaintiffs reasonably relied on the contracts 
executed by the parties and the failure of the Defendant to 
inform them regarding any breach or termination. 
POINT III: JUDGE ANDERSON ERRED IN OVERRULING THE 
DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY JUDGE PAYNE. 
The Defendants first submitted their Motion for Summary 
Judgment on May 19, 1992 (R. 36-62). In a three page decision, 
Judge Payne denied the motion outlining explicitly the factual 
issues that needed to be resolved by a finder of fact. A copy of 
Judge Payne's decision is attached as Exhibit "F" to the Addenda. 
By granting summary judgment, on essentially the same motion 
made before Judge Payne, Judge Anderson violated a long 
recognized principle that once a judge has made a determination 
of a motion, that determination becomes the "law of the case." 
That doctrine embodies the principle that a court should not 
reconsider or overrule a decision made by a co-equal court. 
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 
(Utah 1984). As Justice Zimmermann in that case stated: 
One branch of what is generally termed the doctrine 
of "law of the case" has evolved to avoid the delays 
and difficulties that arise when one judge is 
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presented with an issue identical to one which has 
already been passed upon by a coordinate judge in the 
same case. "[0]rdinarily one judge of the same court 
cannot properly overrule the decision of another judge 
of that court." Richardson v. Grant Central Corp., 
572 P.2d at 397. 
See also, State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994). 
POINT IV: THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CLAIMS 
OF THE DEFENDANT CLELLA ROSS. 
Judge Anderson, in his decision ruled, as a matter of law 
that both the contract and fraud causes of action against the 
Defendant Clella Ross should be dismissed. 
The Plaintiffs submit that there are ample questions 
relating to Mrs. Ross. 
Contrary to the assertions of the Defendants, there is 
ample evidence to support the proposition that Mrs. Ross knew or 
should have known of the misconduct. Mrs. Ross was a signatory 
to both Uniform Real Estate Contracts. Additionally, Mrs. Ross 
after agreeing to convey the property in an unencumbered state to 
the Cordners, signed the Right-of-Way Easement in favor of Moon 
Lake Electric Association. 
It was the Defendants who prepared the Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts signed by the parties. In paragraph 11 of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, Mrs. Ross warranted that there were not any 
assessments or encumbrances on the property. The Defendants knew 
that no easement was listed as an encumbrance within the terms of 
40 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Accordingly, Mrs. Ross knew 
that in contravention of the Contract with the Cordners, she was 
encumbering the property and receiving substantial monies 
therefore. 
In addition, Mrs. Ross was a party to the transfer of the 
land that had been sold to the Plaintiffs to George Mills and his 
wife. That act constitutes the culmination of the fraudulent 
activity in the case. Certainly there is enough to establish a 
prima facie case of her involvement in the improper behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed error in granting summary judgment 
in this case and in doing so misapplied the law and, in violation 
of Rule 56, resolved the factual issues. The Plaintiffs' Causes 
of Action based on contract and fraud were brought within the 
applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment should be reversed. 
Additionally, Judge Anderson's granting of Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment improperly reconsidered the earlier 
decision of Judge Payne in contravention of the "law of the 
case" doctrine. 
Finally, the Plaintiff has established a prima facia case 
against Clella Ross, who was a signatory to all of the critical 
documents executed by the parties in this case. 
DATED this *~ day of December, 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Lake City, Utah, 84111, and Mr. Clark R. Nielsen, HENROID & 
NIELSEN, 60 East South Temple #1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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A D D E N D U M 
Exhibit A: Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 6/10/81. 
UNlhORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this j Q day of £ U n ? , A. D., 19iL<L 
by and between Barrel L. Ross and C l e l l a C. Ross 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and . 
T. Robert Cordner and Gloria Cordner 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of 
«r TwQ acres In the Mall Area Of TheAlrport Ind. Park. 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of _ Duchesne , state of Utah, to-wit: Rooseve l t , Utah 
ADDRESS 
More particularly described as follows: 
Descr ipt ion Attached As Schedule A, 
Description Attached As Schedule B Option To purchase One year From 
S£e Date of this Agreement and Contract.The Price tobe $20,000.00 
•JJSgjpthe one Acre Described.If not Purchased one year from now The 
imyir will have the First Right or Rufusal to Purchase, But the 
Price to be Negotiated By Both Parties. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of . 
$^0.000.00 Forty Thousand and no/Ion Dollars ($40,000.00 > 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order 3 0 2 1 C o m a n c h e L n . PrOVO U t . 8 4 6 0 1 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: TWO T h O U S a n d & N o / l O Q ($ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 — ) 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ - 3 " , 0 0 0 . 0 0 shall be paid as follows: 
$8,000.00 To be paid Sep. 1 1981 
Annual Payments of $6 ,000 .00 Plus I n t r e s t due Annually For 5 Years 
On^the 10 th. Day of June 1982. First Paymentof $6,000.00 willBe 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the _ _ day of 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from J u n e 1 0 t h 1 9 & 1 o n a ^ unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of XW.6lY.e per cent (__ jL2 % ) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. I t J s understood that, there _presejitly eod^ts. ari oblij t j  t  t t, t  jpres jitl  sts.aji ligation agaii 
First Security Bank (Entire Tract; 
2^,000.00
 as of June 1981 
. with an unpaid balance of 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following *V ,& . 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed percent 
( 1 ^  <•/.) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shal} not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said ptoperty, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid bv ,*ller «rJ?e«» 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the -monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
o u i i C x W i b M t i y O X " 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $— 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy^  
,14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that ho will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
10. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
—any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within *1Q days t.hGre?fter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: "~ ~-'~~ ~~ — • -
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contiact as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above desciibed premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, sue- . 
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. s 
Signed in the presence of 
Buyer 
G 3 i 
M C | | 
o 
—» 
3 
TO (D 
Q> 
?P 
3" 
O 
o 
SCHEDULE A 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, 
Range I West of the Uintah Special Base and Meridian; Thence 
East 139.39 feet; Thence North 384.27 feet to the North right-of-way 
line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence North 55° 55'20" East 1250.98 feet 
along said right-of-way line to the Southeast Corner of the MUNICIPAL 
AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK SUBDIVISION, said point being the TRUE POINT 
OF BEGINNING: 
Thence South 55°55'20n West 184.98 feet along said North right-of-way 
line to the East right-of-way line of a City Street; 
Thence North 34°04'40" West 304.11 feet along said right-of-way; 
Thence North 55° 55'20" East 387.97 feet to the East line of said 
SUBDIVISION; 
Thence South 0°21'20" East 365.63 feet along said East line to the 
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, containing 2.00 acres. 
Exhibit B: Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 12/27/82. 
m 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE." 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 2 ? -"k*1* day of D E C * , A. D., 19 . J^L , 
by and between P a r r e l 1 R O S S & C l e l l a C . R O S S 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and . 
T. Robert Cordner & Gloria Cordner 
n 
Description Attached as Schedule B. 
. with an unpaid balance of 
_, as of „ 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following ________________»___, 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and. maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
thep.unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed percent 
( %) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrega te monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to tne amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under * 
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be tb 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of. said prior oblip 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after dat« of this 
said obligations are assumed or approveq* by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Sell-
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said ' 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of Onfi A r . r f i i n T h P M a l l A r P R O f Thf t j ; 
Airport I n d u s t r i a l Park . ! 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, j ; 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in ; ; 
the county of D u c h e s n e , s tate of Utah, to-wit: R o o s e v e l t . U t a h . ; \ 
ADDRESS j , 
More particularly described as follows: 
W\ 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of . 
$20.000.00 Twenty thousand and nn/1 00 Dollars <$_ 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order 3 0 2 1 C o m a n c h e L n . P r O V O , U t a h , 8 ^ 6 0 1 
|:i|| strictly within the following times, to-wit: $ 5 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 & n o / 1 0 0
 ( f 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 » ,; 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 1 5 t OOP . 0 0 shall be paid as follows: 
$3,000.00 to be paid January 31, , 1984 Plus 12J& Intrest. j.; 
Annual Payments of $3,000,00 Per Year on January 31st. Of each Year. 
Untill the Ballance of $15,000.00 Is Paid off In Full. 
This will be a Five year contract after the 
$5,000.00 Down Payment .At $3,000.00 Per Year Plus 12fo Intrest On 
all unpayed Ballance.
 ;;; 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the V ^ - S T day of J a n u a r y ^ 19_J___L. ;:! 
jjij! 4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from J a n u a r y 3 ^ s t • on all unpaid portions of the jjj 
purchase price at the rate of T w e l v e
 p e r c e n t ( Jud ^ p e r a n n u m ^he Buyer, a t his option at anytime, | >! 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage ; ' ! ' < 
i!'|| or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future i 
j j ' installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. | :| 
5. I t is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according j-jii 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will m no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture j >'' 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. j-jj: 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of !.'!" 
Hill 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after . 
#:< 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $« 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
i 14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court: and trie Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto _ _ . 
I: !' 
Fil 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including, a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or l>y the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement; 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of 
hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
7--V. ^WU^? 
Buyer 
>• 
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Exhibit C: Right of Easement and Check. 
RIGHT-OF-WAY EASEMENT 
I, We, Parre l L. Ross and C l e l l a C. Ross 
the undersigned, for good and valuable consideration ».<.., receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby 
grant unto MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION INCor.^CHATED, (hereinafter Called the "Cooperative") 
whose post office address is P.O. Box ?7H. i v.»osavelt. Utah 8406b, . - ^ to its successors or assigns, the exclusive-
~"""
r
~t of-wav P-— -\ V:.* '•• _..- _ lcet wide from the center line as ».^c?fter described, and for said purp: \ 
jnuei&.yncu also giant to Cooperative the right to reasonable ingress and e^ . ^c upon the adjacent lands of '. 
undersigned. Said right-of-way is situated in the County of Duchesne
 tr.*-icni Utah 
and is more particularly described as follows: 
A right of way in the Roosevelt Municipal Airport Subdivision, Roosevelt City 
Survey. The right of way 1556.3 feet in length is bounded on the East by the East 
lot lines of lots 109, 106, and 97 of the Roosevelt Municipal Airport Subdivision. 
The V/est boundary is a line measured at right angles to and lying 50 feet to the 
V/est of the following described center line. Beginning at a point S 88* 04' 10" E 
1163.16 feet from the West one quarter corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 West, U.S.M.: Thence, S 43° 26' 03" W 64.51 feet. Here a radius of 70 
feet^on the turn for anchoring: Thence S 0' 35* 57" E 1491.79 feet, to a point 
S 35* 51* 06" E 1946.67 feet from the West one quarter corner said Section 29. 
NTRY Nc£?7&5JL_ OATH $/..-.At.-fy. TiM£ f-LC&Jkto^ *CO* fixJJ^- PAG£ J / A — 
EE$ _*3fJ3L accorrro AT R E C ^ T or- ^pT^t^^ c&Ubc<.-..J~&^ 
<l%**yLc>„'lJli '.'.,..:.-ir. ».K".--n;-.fa OfrUTI 
and to construct, reconstruct, rephase. repair, operate and maintain on the above described lands and/or in or upon 
all streets, roads or highways, abutting said lands, an electric transmission and/or distribution line or system; to cut, 
trim, remove, and/or control the growth, by chemical means, machinery or otherwise, of trees and shrubbery located 
within —50— feet of the center line of said line or system, or that may reasonably interfere with or threaten to endanger 
the operation and maintenance of said line or system. 
The undersigned agrees that all poles, wires and other facilities, including any main service entrance equipment, 
installed on the above-described lands at the Cooperative's expense shall remain the property of the Cooperative, 
removable at the option of the Cooperative, upon termination of service to or on said lands. 
The undersigned convenants that he/she/they is/are the owner of the above-described lands and that the said lands 
are free and clear of encumbrances and liens of whatsoever character except those held by the following persons: 
Name Address 
(Insert Name and Address of Lien Holder, or if no liens, the word "NONE") 
It is further understood that, whenever necessary, words used in this instrument in the singular shall be construed to 
read in the plural and that words used in the masculine gender shall be construed to read in the feminine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has set his/her/their hand and seal^us^ day of 
19 . 
GRANTORS /<£& 
Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of: 
WITNESSES: 
fllL'^/ft^; 
STATE OF U f c h \
 ss. 
County „< utflK - j 
On the i £ _ d a y of PjPPl ' 19^7 , personally appeared before me fhiyVVJ L- /TOTS 
&T\(A CI^JlCl P,. r\OS^\ , the signer(s) of the abovve\nstrumeYil. who duly 
acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same. : * c 
Notary/Public 
My Commission Expires: )0/>*\t>\ ''/l/T^ 
f)[}a 10 J gib Residing at: 'J'QWJ,. (ALUL ( DEPOSITION | EXHIBIT I 
DEPOSITED WITH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
UNIVERSITY OFFICE 
P.O. Box 69 
Provo, Utah 84603 
TO THE CREDIT OF 
DARREL L. ROSS OR CLELLA C. ROSS 
BUSINESS ACCOUNT 
3021 COMANCHE LANE 801-375-3404) 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
ALL ITEMS ARE RECEIVED BY THIS SANK FOR PURPOSES OF COLLECTION 
AND ARE SUBJECT TO T H E U N I F O R M COMMERCIAL CODE. 
ALL CREDITS FOR ITEMS ARE PROVISIONAL U N T I L COLLECTED. 
i : i 2 i « 3 0 0 20i.«: 3 3 iO 270 8«« IE / 000 13 5 5100/ 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
Exhibit D: Special Warranty Deed from Ross to Mills. 
6 S 
cNiRr HO&5Q22Z i' rt Izk-Zl.... riMb/^ jrAi?i««oOK Adtt. 'AGt .4A&--"7 
mtJjll , _ T _^. RECORI 0 AT REQUEST OF <&ft<a.«« t.m'fiJ.—3<//f* C * 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
OR'GIAML 
$ 
"V. 
•J 
DARREL L. ROSS, 
3021 Commanche I 
Grantor, hereby 
GEORGE W. MILLS 
10681 North 537( 
Grantees, as joi 
<nd CLELLA C. ROSS, husband and wife, of 
»ne, Provo, Utah County, State of Utah, 
!ONVEY and WARRANT to 
md DIANA F. MILLS, husband and wife, of 
West, Highland, Utah County, State of Utah, 
«t tenants, 
for TEN DOLLARS tnd other good and valuable consideration, 
certain real pr< 
Utah, and more \ 
attached hereto. 
WITNESS the han< 
December, 1985. 
»erty situated in Duchesne County, State of 
irticularly described on Exhibit "A" 
\ of said Grantors this £{ day of 
'7 
)ARREL L. ROSS, Grantor 
:LELLA C. ROSS, Grantor 
V^P^ 
CL 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS. 
County of Utah ) 
On the £'/ day of December, 1985, DARREL L. RO$S and 
CLELLA C. ROSS appeared personally before me and acknowl-
edged to me that they did execute the foregoing for./the" 
purposes therein stated. \ * . t ] » 
P ''•' 
My commiss ion e x p i r e s : Dmmissi  
N6tfary P u b l i c "~' 
R e s i d i n g a t ^fateX^frJL^ Utah 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
ZL_ 
(iJV 
EXHIBIT "A" 
The following described real property situated in Duchesne 
County, State of Utah: 
Lots 85 through 88, 94 through 97, and 101 through 106, and 10& 
MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK SUBDIVISION, a subdivision 
of Section 29, T. 2 S., R. 1 W., Unitah Special Meridian, as 
annexed to the City of Roosevelt, and according to the 
official plat thereof in the office of the Recorder of 
Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
TOGETHER with all appurtances thereunto belonging. 
SUBJECT to all existing easements and rights-of-way. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, and mineral rights. 
Together with the following additional parcels, also 
situated in Duchesne County, State of Utah: 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2 
South, Range 1 West of the Uintah Special Base and Meridian; 
Thence East 139.39 feet; Thence North 384.27 feet to the 
North right-of-way line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence North 
55* 55* 20" East 1250.98 feet along said right-of-way line 
to the Southeast Corner of the MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL 
PARK SUBDIVISION, said point being the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING: -
Thence South 65* 65' 20M West 184.98 feet along said North 
right-of-way line to the East right-of-way line of a City 
Street; Thence North 34* 04' 40" West 304.11 feet along 
said right-of-way; Thence North 55* 55' 20" East 387.97 
feet to the East line of said SUBDIVISION; 
Thence South 0* 21* 20" East 365.63 feet along said East 
line to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, containing 2.00 acres. 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2 
South, Range 1 West of the Uintah Special Base and Meridian; 
Thence East 139.39 feet; Thence North 384.27 feet to the 
North right-of-way line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence North 
55* 55* 20" East 1250.98 feet along said right-of-way to the 
Southeast Corner of the MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK 
SUBDIVISION; thence North 0* 21• 20" West 365.63 feet along 
the East line of said SUBDIVISION to the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING: 
Thence South 55# 55' 20" West 387.97 feet to the East right-
of-way of a City Street; 
Thence North 34* 04' 40" West 103.13 feet along said right-
of-way line; 
Thence North 55* 55* 20" East 456.80 to said East 
SUBDIVISION line; 
Thence South 0# 21' 20" East 123.99 feet to the TRUE POINT 
OF BEGINNING, containing 1.00 acres. 
Exhibit E: Judge Payne's Decision and Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
SEP 2 81992 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
in and for Duchesne County 
of the State of Utah 
T. ROBERT CORDNER & GLORIA CORDNER 
VS. 
DARREL L. ROSS 6c CLELLA C. ROSS 
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY 
NO. 91-CV-125-D 
DATE: SEPTEMBER 14, 19S2 
JUDGE: A. LYNN PAYNE 
D E C I S I O N 
The matter comes before the undersigned pursuant to the defendants 
motion for Summary Judgment dated May 14, 1992, The court having 
reviewed the memorandum and affidavit now rules as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs as "purchasers" and the defendants as "sellers" 
entered into uniform real estate contracts dated June 10, 1981 
and December 27, 1982. On or about April 6, 1984 the sellers 
granted Moon Lake Electric a utility easement across the property 
which they had previously agreed to convey to the sellers. By the 
end of July of 1984 purchasers became aware of the encumbrances 
when they observed large electrical lines upon the property. 
Thereafter, the parties discussed the existence of the power 
s upon the property. The parties apparently disagree as to the 
re of the discussion between the parties . For the purpose of 
r motion, sellers take the position that purchasers indicated 
they didn't want the property; and that the purchasers 
ructed the sellers to sell the property and give them their 
y back. Purchasers do not dispute the above but also 
tain that there was also discussion about moving the boundary 
so that the utility easement would not be within the property 
re conveyed. 
Often discovering the utility lines, the purchaser did not 
: further payment under the contract. However the purchaser did 
a portion of the property tax,e& in November of 1984. 
4. Neither party brought action for breach of contract (i.e. the 
seller did not seek to enforce the provisions of the contract for 
failure to make installment payments and purchaser did not 
seek to enforce the provisions with respect to breach of 
contract by creating an easement). 
2. 
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5. The sellers conveyed the property to third parties on December 
27, 1985. This deed was recorded with the Duchesne County 
Recorder on January 6, 1986. The property has not been improved 
since the original 1981 contract. 
6. After the parties discussion concerning taxes in November of 
1984 they did not again discuss this transaction until the commence-
ment of this action. During that time, the purchaser visited the 
property site at least four times. However, there was apparently 
nothing at the property site whichjwould indicate that the property 
had been resold. 
7. Generally the granting of a utility easement creates an 
encumbrance upon the property which can not be cured. In 
this case, a cause of action for breach of the contractual 
covenant not to create such easements would arise upon discovery of 
the easement in 1984. In this case the purchaser claims that the 
cause of action would not arise until the deed was to be conveyed 
upon full payment of the purchaselprice. However, because the 
purchaser did not continue to make payment it is clear that they 
elected to treat the existence ofythe easement as an immediate 
breach of the contract rather than to continue to make payments in 
the hope that the encumbrance could be cured. Therefore, under 
general principals of law the cause of action for breach would have 
existed by July of 1984, and six year statute would have expired 
prior to the filing of this action in August of 1991. 
8. However, in this case there is an i s s ue,_.a s - to whether, the 
partTes entered iTito an agreementT~wherein the sellers would resell 
th^—propexty—and retuTrT"the^~ohXes which^urchaser trad"~paTdT From 
ttre^ f-atrts—i-n-^ this'^ crase it is cl~ea~r~ that the parties intended that 
the purchaser would continue to have some interest in the property, 
after July of 1984. This is evidenced by the request of the sellers 
that the purchasers help pay the property tax payments in November 
of 1984, and, arguably by the failure of the sellers to enforce the 
contract provision which required installment payments. The 
record is not clear as to whetherjthe parties entered into an 
agreement to resell the property or whether the sellers otherwise 
caused purchasers to reasonably believe that the property would be 
sold and the payments refunded. 
9. If the sellers lead the purchasers to reasonably believe that 
the property. would be sold and that the payments would be returned, 
there exists an issue as to f raucjjeither at the time of the 
discussion in 1984 or fraud in the concealment of the sale. 
10. If the parties agreed that the property would be resold 
and the payments returned, that cause of action would not arise 
until the sale was made and the sellers did not return the 
payments. When fraud ia alleged, the cause of action may be 
tolled until the purchasers discovered the property had been 
resold, or with reasonable diligence would have discovered the sale 
of the property. In this case the purchasers did not discover 
the sale until 1990. Therefore, if there was fraud in concealing 
the sale the Statute of Limitations may not have run. 
11. The court will hold that the cause of action for breach under 
the original contract has run. Absent a further agreement to 
adjust the boundaries or to return the payments (or sellers 
actions which reasonably lead the purchasers to believe that the 
parties would adjust the boundaries or return payments), the 
statute of limitations has run on purchasers cause of action. 
However, the facts which have been presented to the court are not 
sufficient for the court to rule on Xhe legal affect of the parties 
discussions after the breach was discovered. The court can not 
rule as a matter of law that there was no fraud. 
12. In ruling on the above the court has obviously not accepted the 
filing of the deed to the third party purchasers in 1986 as notice 
as a matter of law. The filing of this notice however may be 
relevant to the issue of whether the purchaser should have 
discovered the sale by the use of reasonable diligence prior to 
December of 1990. 
13. While it is not necessary for the court to rule on the affect 
of the claimed change of $20.50 in 1986 the court is having 
difficulty understanding how this unilateral action on the part of 
the sellers could affect the purchasers cause of action for breach 
of the warranty of title. Often an acceptance of part payment may 
affect the timing of the sellers cause of action for breach of 
contract with respect to installment payments, but not the 
purchasers cause of action. Nevertheless, the court does not rule 
upon this issue at this time. 
Based upon the foregoing the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this X / day of September, 1992. 
District Court Judge 
ALP:mbp 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed by first class mail a true copy of the 
foregoing ruling to Michael J. Petro, 101 East 200 South, Springville, 
Utah 84663 and Arthur H. Nielsen, Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East 
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by depositing in the U. S. Mail 
this <pdyi day of September, 1992. 
(km /rn jtOZcirncA 
D i s t r i c t Cour t C l e r k 
•96 JUL 10 ^8 28 Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Clark R. Nielsen 
HENWOD& NIELSEN - ^ 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160 /f\ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ^ 
Telephone: (801) 322-0591 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
m^mmmmKSSSsssSsmmmmmmmmmsssssssssssjmmmmmmmmSKBSSBSXSXmi 
T. ROBERT CORDNER and GLORIA 
CORDNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DARRELL L. ROSS and CLELLA C. 
ROSS,. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 91CV125D 
The Honorable John R. Anderson 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before the above Court on 
Monday, June 18, 1996 at 1:45 p.m. for argument and detcimination; the Plaintiffs were 
represented by their attorney, Michael Petro, who appeared with the Plaintiff Robert 
Cordner; the Defendants were represented by Arthur H. Nielsen, Nielsen & Senior and by 
Clark R. Nielsen, Henriod & Nielsen, who appeared with Defendant Darrell Ross. 
After hearing the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed and considered the 
memoranda and affidavits filed herein, the depositions of the Plaintiff Robert Cordner, 
the Memorandum Decision dated September 14,1992, and all other documents and 
pleadings filed herein, the Court makes the following determinations: 
The underlying facts relevant to Defendants' motion for summary judgment are 
undisputed. To the extent there is any disputed, relevant fact, the Court views the 
evidence in light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. The relevant facts are that the Plaintiffs 
and Defendants entered into two uniform real estate contracts in June 1981 and December 
1982; in breach of those contracts, Defendants gave an easement across the property in 
March or April 1984; Plaintiff Robert Cordner was personally aware of the easement and 
breach in July 1984, when he told Defendant Darrell Ross that Ross had breached his 
contract with the Plaintiffs. At that time, Mr. Cordner demanded his payments back. At 
that time, Defendant Ross offered to adjust the boundaries to the property being sold but 
no agreement was reached between the parties to do so or to return any payments made. 
After Mr. Cordner treated the contracts as breached by Defendants, Plaintiff did not take 
any legal action to enforce his rights or seek legal redress until August 1991. As a result, 
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, Causes I and II of the Amended Complaint, are 
barred by the six-year statute of limitation for actions on a written contract, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-23. 
2 
Plaintiffs also claim that they were defrauded or lulled into inaction by the offer of 
Defendant DaiTell Ross in July 1984 to change the boundaries and to get back to 
Plaintiffs regarding that offer. The parties were then on an equal footing and neither had 
any advantage over the other. There was neither any agreement between the parties to 
return any payments nor promise by Defendant Ross to change the boundaries. There is 
no evidence that the Defendants concealed any claim or fact from the Plaintiff or made 
any false representation that rises to the level of fraud. To the extent Plaintiffs claim the 
statute of limitations is tolled because they were lulled into inaction on their claims by the 
promise o£ lTU get back to you," the Court determines that any reliance thereon for over 
seven years was unreasonable and does not excuse Plaintiffs* failure to act within the 
period of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' failure to institute a legal action for over 
seven years was not reasonable or excusable neglect, based upon the undisputed facts in 
this case. 
Although the result may appear to be unequitable based upon the amounts Mr. 
Cordner claims he has paid on the contracts, there is no reason not to apply the statutes of 
limitations when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Under 
any theory for recovery advanced in Plaintiffs' amended complaint or in their argument in 
opposition to summary judgment, the statute of limitations has run and the Plaintiffs' 
claims have expired. 
3 
The Court independently concludes there is no evidence or factual allegation of 
any wrongdoing by the Defendant Clella Ross beyond any claim for breach of contract by 
giving the easement. As discussed, such claim is bailed by the statute of limitations. 
Clella Ross is independently entitled to dismissal of all claims against her. 
After considering the entire record herein, and based upon the forgoing 
determinations, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby GRANTED. For the reasons set forth 
herein and those stated by the court in its oral ruling, summary judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' complaint and 
each of Plaintiffs' claims therein are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this /S^Hiay of July, 1996. 
: Honorable John R. Anderson 
District Judge 
Seventh Judicial District Court 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for Plamtiffs 
AtieHfey for Defendants 
